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530 EASTON V. ASH. [18 C. (2d) 
year since the season of 1935, and that the users are receiving 
water master supervision in the current irrigation season. 
Here again. the appellants do not claim that they have been 
depriv~d of the use .of any water to which they are justly 
entitled. . 
The final decree and the supplemental order, dated April 
18, 1940, are and each is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Moore, J. pro 
tem., concurred. ' 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
25, 1941. 
fL. A. No. 17249. In Bank.-Aug. 28, 1941.J 
CRAS. M. EASTON, Appellant, v. KENNETH K. ASH 
et al.,) Respondents. 
[1] Limitation of Actioll$-Acknowledgment - Sufficiency - Con· 
sideration.-,-A . pre-existing debt, although barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, is a sufficient consideration to support & 
new acknowledgment of, or promise to pay, the indebtedness; 
and is, therefore, ample consideration for a renewal agreement. 
[2a, 2b] Mortgages - Performance - Change in Form - Renewal. 
The execution of a new note and mortgage after the running 
,of the statute of limitations on the original obligation does not 
extinguish it, but rather serves to renew it in the absence of 
an agreemen~ that the new note shall operate as payment. 
[8] Limitation ot Actions-Acknowledgment-Operation and Ef· 
fect.-Ifthe ,statute of limitations has run upon an original 
indebte.dnesswhen a new agreemtlnt is made, the action is 
upon the new promise, ,but the creditor is not required to sue 
upo:h' the promise made 'nearest the time of the running of the 
statute. If, after the statute has run, the debtor has made 
"several acknowledgments of the dept sufficient in law to sus-
".:,~,tain aI,l, a~tion, the creditor may elect to sue upon anyone of 
,them." 
':' MCK. 'Dig~R~ferences: 1. Limitation of Ac:ions, § 128; 2. Mort-
gages, § 262;' 3. Limitation of Actions, § 129; 4. Limitation of Ac-
tions, § 125; 5. Mortgages, § 403 (3) ;6. Mortgages, § 226; 7. Mort-
gages, § 420; 8. Agency, § 167; 9. 'Guaranty, § 43; 10. Mortgages, 
§ 124; ll. Appeal, § 938. 
~ 
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[4] Id.- Acknowledgment - To Whom Made - Personal Repre-
sentative.-An acknowledgment of or promise to pay an ex-
isting indebtedness may properly be made to the administra-
tor or executor of the payee's estate. And when a renewal 
agreement shows that the promise is made to the personal 
representative as such, the moral obligation to pay the origi-
nal debt is sufficient consideration therefor. 
[5] Mortgages-Foreclosure-Limitations-Tolling Statute-Suffi-
ciency.-The purpose of Code Civ. Pro c., § 360, is to establish 
a rule, not with respect to the character of the promise or 
acknowledgment from which a promise may be inferred, but 
with reference to the kind of evidence necessary to prove the 
promise or acknowledgment. A renewal agreement, executed 
with the formalities required by Civ. Code, § 2922, and signed 
by the mortgagors through their attorney in fact, which pro-
vides that they hereby renew said mortgage and note and 
promise and agree to the terms thereof and to the extension 
of the same, is a promise to pay the note, sufficient not only to 
revive the indebtedness but to renew the original mortgage 
as well and this, whether it was executed on the date it bears 
or on the date of the acknowledgment thereon. 
[6] Id.-Maturity-Extension of Time of Payment-Renewal and 
Note and Mortgage as One Transaction.-The fact that a re-
newal agreement bears the same date of execution as the new 
note and· mortgage cannot . operate to bind the three instru-
ments into a single inseparable transaction. 
[7] Id.- Foreclosure-Trial-Findings -- Date of Execution.-A 
finding that a renewal agreement was executed "as of" a cer-
tain date, considered in connection with the evidence and other 
findings, was a finding, not that the agreement was executed 
on such day, but that it was merely so dated. 
[8] Agency - Relation Between Agent and Third Person - Lia-
bility of Agent.--A person incurs no liability by reason of the 
renewal of a mortgage executed by him as attorney in fact for 
the mortgagors where he is acting not in his individual capa-
city but as agent for them, and his acts are lawful and within 
the scope of his authori~y. 
[9] Guaranty-Actions Against Guarantor-Time to Sue-Tolling 
Statute.-Acts by a principal obligor cannot toll the statute 
of limitations as to his guarantor in the absence of a provision 
in the contract of guaranty to that effect. 
4. To whom must acknowledgment, new promise or payment be 
made in order to toll statute of limitations after creditor's death, 
note, 117 A. L. R. 224. See, also, 16 Cal. Jur. 594; 34 Am. Jur. 255. 
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[10] Mortgages-Rights, Duties and Liabilities-Injury to Prop-
erty.-A mortgagee is entitled to recover damages from the 
mortgagor and third persons for cutting trees on the prem-
ises when these acts render the mortgage insufficient security 
for the debt. 
[11] Appeal-Dismissal-Effect of Determination.-An order de-
nying a motion to dismiss an appeal must be deemed a final 
determination of the timeliness of filing notice of appeal. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of River-
side County. R. A. Moore, Judge pro tem. Judgment for 
one defendant reversed with directions; judgments for 
remaining defendants reversed. 
Action to foreclose mortgage and for damages for cutting 
down trees on the mortgaged premises. Judgment against 
foreclosure reversed with directions; judgments of nonsuit on 
cause of action for dam~ges reversed. 
Chas. M. Easton, in pro. per., and Ray Howard for Appel-
lant. 
Meserve, Mumper, Hughes & Robertson, Meserve, Mumper 
& Hughes, Leo E. Anderson and James A. Hall for Re-
spondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 28,1924, defendants Ash, acting 
through defendant Cross, to whom they had given a power of 
attorney, executed a note for $1000 payable six months after 
date and a mortgage upon certain real property in Riverside 
County to Henry Hileman. Defendant Cross subsequently 
agreed to pay all th~ interest due or to become due on the 
mortgage and note. The interest was paid to June 29, 1930. 
In 1930 Henry Hileman died and his widow Rena was ap-
pointed executrix of his estate. On December 10, 1930, de-
fendailts Ash, acting through defendant Cross, executed a 
llQte and mortgage in favor of Rena Hileman for the sum of 
$1000 payable in monthly installments. This m'Jrtgage was 
'" never recorded because plaintiff had instructed the title com-
pany, to whom the mortgage and a release of the first mort-
gage had been delivered, not to record it until it would appear 
as a first lien upon the property. 
10. See 17 Cal. 'ifnr. 1054; 19 R. C. L. 326. 
.:, 
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Defendants Ash, through defendant Cross, also entered into 
. the following written agreement with Rena Hileman" as of" 
December 10, 1930: 
"RENEWAL AND EXTENSION OF NOTE AND 
MORTGAGE 
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That 
whereas,heretofore, to-wit: on the 28th day of June, 1924, 
a certain mortgage was executed by Kenneth K. Ash and Ada 
Gertrude Ash, husband and wife, by and through their At-
torney-in-fact, Margaret Cross, a single woman, mortgagors, 
. to Henry Hileman, mortgagee, securing a note of even [date n 
therewith in the sum of $1000.00, which mortgage is now of 
record in the office of the County Recorder of Riverside 
County, California, in Book 237, Page 430 of mortgages of said 
. County; and WHEREAS, said note and mortgage has hereto-
. fore been extended by the holder thereof, and WHEREAS, 
Henry Hileman is now deceased and Rena Hileman was ap-
pointed executrix of his estate in and by the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County, California, said probate proceedings 
being numbered 112775, and WHEREAS, said Rena Hileman, 
the widow of said deceased is the duly appointed, qualified 
and acting executrix of said estate, and WHEREAS, it is 
mutually desired by all parties thereto and hereto that said 
note and mortgage be renewed and extended and that the 
terms and conditions of said mortgage remain the same and 
that it is mutually understood and agreed that such renewal 
and extension is for the best interests of said estate and par-
ties hereto. 
"NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of one dollar in 
hand paid by the mortgagors to the mortgagee and holder of 
said mortgage and note, the receipt whereof is hereby ac-
knowledged, the said Rena Hileman hereby renews and ex-
tends the said mortgage and note and the maturity thereof 
for a period of forty (40) months from and after February 
1st, 1931, and the said mortgagors hereby renew said mort-
gage and note and promise and agree to the terms thereof 
and the extension of the same and undertake and bind their. 
heirs and assigns to the further condition that said mortgage 
shall be and remain a first and prior lien on and against said 
property. 
W,A'YN;HEA 
~ TTOR'N-EY :A f LA VII 
.~ 5 ""fA Yt'C"R . S T'. (*;!? 4~8054 
,~ 'FRA'NciISCO '2:. (cA.'LXF .. 
'( 
! 
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"WITNESS the hands of the mortgagee and mortgagors, 
by and through their attorney-in-fact Margaret Cross, this 
10th day of December, 1930. 
KENNETH K. ASH, 
ADA GERTRUDE ASH, 
Mortgagors. 




An' acknowledgment dated August 9, 1934, appears at the 
, end of this agreement. 
On April 7, 1936, the note and mortgage of 1924, the note 
and, mortgage of December 10, 1930, and the renewal agree-
ment set forth above were distributed to Rena Hileman and 
she 'thereafter ,assigned them to the plaintiff, the present 
owner and holder. ,No pa~t of, the principal sum of either of 
,the notes has been paid, and plaintiff brought this action ask-
,ing • for foreclosure of, the original mortgage based on the last 
'rell;ewal agreement, and for damages' against defendants 
;GeorgeF.Scott and Warren L. Holbrook as well as defend- ~ 
;~nts Ash' and'; defendant Cross for allegedly cutting down 
'eucalyptus t;rees growing upon the land. 
. "The trial court found that the renewal agreement was with-
out consideration and of no force and effect, that the 1924 
note and defendant Cross's guaranty were barred by the provi-
sions of suhdivision one of section 337 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, that the 1930 note was cancelled by waiver in open 
court, and that the liens of both mortgages were extinguished. 
,Judgment was given in favor of the Ashes and a nonsuit was 
granted in favor of defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross. 
Plaintiff, has appealed. 
[1] The finding of the trial court that the renewal agree-
m~nt was, without consideration is not supported by the evi-
'dence nor is it a correct conclusion of law. The agreement 
recites that it was the wish of the parties to renew and extend 
the mortgage and note of June, 1924, and that the mortgagors 
"renew said mortgage and note" and "promise and agree to 
the terms thereof and the extension of the same." It is well 
settled in California that a pre-existing debt, although barred 
by the statute of limitations, is sufficient consideration to sup-
port a ne,w, acknQwledgment of or promise to pay the indebt-
Aug. 1941.] EASTON V. ASH. 
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edness (Ooncannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14 [66 Pac. 40] ; Fergu-
son v. Fonner, 87 Cal. App. 590 [262 Pac. 337]. See Estate 
of McOonnell, 6 Cal. (2d) 493 [58 Pac. (2d) 639]), or the 
execution of a deed (Ferguson v. Larson, 139 Cal. App. 133 
[33 Pac. (2d) 1061]. See Ohicheste.r v. Mason, 43 Cal. App. 
(2d) 577 [111 Pac. (2d) 362]), 'or mortgage. (Foster v. 
lVarren, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 470 [103 Pac. (2d) 591].) The 
original indebtedness was therefore ample consideration for 
the execution' of the renewal agreement. 
,[2a] The original indebtedness was not extinguished by 
the execution of the note and mortgage of December 10, 1930. 
At the time the 1930 note and mortgage were executed, the 
statute of limitations had run upon the original note and 
mortgage. When the new note and mortgage were executed 
it is undisputed that the parties intended them as a renewal 
of the original obligation and lien. It has been held in this 
state that the acceptance by a mortgagee of a new note and 
niortgage as a renewal of or substitution for an existing note 
and mortgage does not itself operate to extinguish or dis-
charge the original obligation. (White v. Stevenson, 144 Cal. 
104 [77 Pac. 828] ; Pacific Nat. Agr. Oredit Oorp. v. Wilbur, 
2 Cal. (2d) 576 [42 Pac. (2d) 314] ; Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 
280 [24 Pac. 743] ; Palmer v. Emanuel, 77 Cal. App. 766 [247 
Pac. 609]. See Newman v. Nickell, 50 Cal. App. 138, 140 
[194 Pac. 710] ; Oollege Nat. Bank v. Morrison, 100 Cal. App. 
403, 407 [280 Pac. 218].) "One executory agreement is not 
extinguished by the execution of another between the same 
parties; nor is a security for an obligation merged in another 
security of the same degree which is accepted for the same 
obligation. It is a well-settled rule that, in the absence of an 
agreement to that' effect, a promissory note is not paid by the 
execution of another note, but that the time for its payment is 
thereby merely suspended until the maturity of the new note. " 
(White v. Stevenson, supra, at page 108. See also Oopp v. 
Millen, 11 Cal. (2d) 122 [77 Pac. (2d) 1093].) 
[3] This principle is not affected by the running of the 
statute of limitations upon the original indebtedness. If the 
statute has run when the new agreement is made, the action 
is upon the new promise, but the creditor is not required to 
sue upon the promise made nearest to the time of the running 
of the statute. If, after the statute has run, the debtor has 
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to sustain an action, the creditor may elect to sue upon any 
of them. Suit upon an acknowledgment is not precluded by 
the existence of earlier acknowledgments or promises. 
[2b] In the present case, the 1930 note was an executory 
agreement taken by the plaintiff's assignor in renewal of a 
pre-existing and unperformed executory agreement. There 
is no evidence, nor do defendants contend, that the 1930 note 
was intended by either of the parties as payment of the debt. 
In the absence of such an agreement, the 1930 note ap.d mort-
gage served to renew the original note and mortgage, not to 
extinguish them. 
[4] Defendants contend that the moral obligation to pay 
the original debt was, not consideration in the instant case be-
cause the 1930 note and mortgage and the renewal agreement 
were not made in favor of the estate of Henry Hileman, the 
owner of the 1924 note and mortgage, but in favor of Rena 
Hileman, who, it is contended, owned no claim against the 
defendants. Th,e renewal agreement upon which plaintiff 
bases his right to recover, however, refers to Rena Hileman as 
the duly appointed, qualified and acting executrix of the 
estate of Henry Hileman. An acknowledgment of or promise :., 
to pay an existing indebtedness may properly be made to, the 
administrator or executor of the payee's estate. (Farrell v. 
Palmer, 36 Cal. 187. See cases cited in 117 A. L. R. 228. 
See also Wilcox v. Gregory, 135 Cal. 217 [67 Pac. 139] ; Moore 
v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723 [91 Pac. 616] ; Altube v. Aguirre, 59 
Cal. App. 762, 766 [212 Pac. 217].) The language of the 
renewal agreement shows that the promise of defendants was 
made to Rena Hileman in her capacity as executrix of the 
estate of HEmry Hileman. 
[5] Defendants contend further that the renewal agree-
ment was not a sufficient acknowledgment of or promise to pay 
the debt to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. No 
particular form for such an acknowledgment or promise is 
prescribed. (Searles v. Gonzalez, 191 Cal. 426 [216 Pac. 1003, 
28 A. L. R. 78].) Section 360 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure requires only thatthe acknowledgment or promise be in 
a writing signed by the party to be charged. Its purpose is 
'to establish· a rule, not' with respect to the ch;:.tracter of the 
promise or acknowledgment from which a promise may be 
inferred, but with respect to the kind of evidence necessary 
to prove the promise or acknowledgment. (Shirley v. Shir-
Zey, 83 Cal. App. 386 [256 Pac. 823] ; Lehman v.Newcomer, 
Aug. 1941.] EASTON V. ASH. 
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118 Cal. App. 145 [4 Pac. (2d) 994].) In the instant case 
the renewal agreement, signed by defendants Ash through 
their attorney in fact, provides that the said mortgagors 
"hereby renew said mortgage and note and promise and 
agree to the terms thereof and the extension of the same." 
Here is a clear promise to pay the note. 
The renewal agreement was sufficient not only to revive 
the indebtedness but to renew the original mortgage as well. 
Although a new promise to pay a debt made after the statute 
has run does not itself revive a mortgage barred by the run-
ning of the statute on the original debt (Weinberger v. 
Weidman, 134 Cal. 599 [66 Pac. 869] ; Sanford v. Bergin, 156 
Cal. 43 [103 Pac. 333] ; Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn, 157 Cal. 
237 [107 Pac. 111] ; Fontana Land 00. v. Laughlin, 199 Cal. 
625 [250 Pac. 669, 48 A. L. R. 1308]), the mortgage may be 
renewed by a compliance with the provisions of section 2922 
of the Civil Code which provides that: "A mortgage can be 
created, renewed or extended, only by writing, executed with 
the formalities required in the case of a grant of real prop-
erty." (See Southern Pacific 00. v. Prosser, 122 Cal. 413 
[52 Pac. 836, 55 Pac. 145] ; Oonway v. Supreme Oouncil O. K. 
of ..4.., 137 Cal. 384, 389 [70 Pac. 223]; Sanford v. Bergin, 
supra.) The renewal agreement in the present case was exe-
euted with the formalities required by section 2922 and con-
tains an acknowledgment of the 1924 mortgage and debt suf-
ficient to renew both and to start a new period of limitation. 
(See Moore v. Gould, supra.) 
This new period' of limitation began on the new maturity 
date set forth in the renewal agreement, namely forty months 
from and after February 1st, 1931, or June 1st, 1934. 
(Steiner v. Davis, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 692, 695 [76 Pac. (2d) 
157].) An ac'tion thereon could thus not be barred before 
June 1, 1938. The complaint was filed in May, 1937, well, 
within the statutory period, and it is immaterial whether the 
renewal agreement was executed on the date it bears, Decem. 
ber 10, 1930, or on the date of the acknowledgment thereon, 
August 9, 1934. . 
[6] It is also immaterial whether or 'not plaintiff waived 
his right to recover under the 1930 note and mortgage. The 
action was brought upon the 1924 note and mortgage and the 
agreement specifically renewing them, and those instruments 
constituted a sufficient cause of action in themselves. The 
fact that the renewal agreement bears the same date of execu-
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tion as the new note and mortgage cannot operate to bind 
the three instruments into a single inseparable transaction. 
[7] The trial court did not find that the renewal agreement 
was, executed on December 10, 1930, but that it was executp,d 
It as of" that date. Taken with the evidence that it was actu-
ally executed,in 1934 on the date of its acknowledgment, and 
th.e finding of the court that "said renewal agreement was 
intended and it was the agreement of the parties thereto that 
it did not and would not change the' provisions of said note 
and mortgage of 1930," the finding of the court was not that 
it was executed on December 10, 1930, but that it was merely 
':sodated. The plaintiff evidently believed that a subsequent 
'renewal in the form of:the renewal agreement would operate 
'to preserve the original lien of the first mortgage and give it 
priority over any ,intervening lien upon the property. 
[8] Defendant Cross incurred no liability by reason of the 
renewals executed by her as attorney in fact for the defend-
ants Ash since she was acting not in her individual capacity 
Qut .as agent 'for them and her acts were lawful and within 
the 'scope of her authority. (Moore v. Gould, supra.) [9] 
The statute, oflim,itations had run against her agreement to 
pay the interest on 'the mortgage and there was no showing 
that this agreement was renewed. Acts by a principal obligor 
cannot toll the statute as to his guarantor in the absence of 
a provision in the contract of guaranty to that effect. (Purdy 
v. Maree,31 Cal. App. (2d) 125 [87 Pac. (2d) 390].) 
[10] Plaintiff also appeals from judgments of nonsuit in 
favor of defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross. Upon a mo-
tion for nonsuit the court must assume that all the evidence 
favorable to the plaintiff is true and must construe all pre-
sumptions, inferences, and doubtful questions in a manner 
most favorable to the plaintiff. (Richardes v. Richardes, 211 
Cal. 392 [295 Pac. 816] ; Babe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 198 
Cal. 290 [244 Pac. 1077] ; Henley v. Bursell, 61 Cal. App. 
511 [215 Pac. 114].) Conflicting or contradictory evidence 
must be disregarded. (Rabe v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
supraj Henley v. Bursell, supraj Marchetti v. Southern Pa-
cific 00., 204 Cal. 679 [269 Pac. 529].) If there, is evidence 
to sustain the plaintiff's action, or if the evidence is conflict-
ing, a nonsuit should be denied. In the light of these rules, 
it is apparent that the granting of a nonsuit as to these de-
fendants was error. The plaintiff testified that he objected 
to the cutting of trees on the land and insisted that such 
~ 
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action be stopped. There was also testimony by a licensed 
real estate broker that the land was not worth over $200, 
that when it is covered by a stand of timber the trees consti-
tute its principal value,that there is no firewood value to the 
trees now standing on the property, and that the value of the 
land was the same in 1934 as in 1937. 
A mortgagee has a right of action for damages against his 
mortgagor and third persons who have cut and removed tim-
ber from the mortgaged land when these acts have rendered 
the mortgage insufficient se~urity for the debt. (Robinson v. 
Russell, 24 Cal. 467, 473; Buclwut v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433 [87 
Am. Dec. 90] ; Lavenson v. Standard Soap 00., 80 Cal. 245 
[22 Pac. 184, 13 Am. St. Rep. 147] ; Van Pelt v . .. McGraw, 4 
N. Y. 110. See cases cited in 19 Ruling Case Law, 326.) The 
principal amount of the debt owed to the plaintiff was $1000, 
,and since the value of the land lay chiefly in its timber, it is 
clear that the cutting of the trees materially impaired the 
value of the security. There is no evidence that the executrix, 
Rena Hileman, the owner of the mortgage at the time of the 
cutting, had any personal knowledge of or ever assented to 
the cutting of the trees. 
[11] The contention of defendants Scott, Holbrook and 
Cross that the notice of appeal was filed too late was settled 
by the orders of this court on December 5, 1939, and January 
16, 1940, denying the motions of these defendants to dismiss 
the appeal as to them. These rulings must be deemed final. 
(Edwards v. Brockway, 16 Cal. App. 626, 631 [117 Pac. 787]. 
See White v. Fresno Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. 166, 167 [32 Pac. 979 J.) 
The judgment in favor of defendants Ash is reversed with 
instructions to enter judgment for the foreclosure of the 
mortgage upon the property. The judgments of nonsuit as 
to defendants Scott, Holbrook and Cross are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., 
and Pullen J., pro tem., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Sep-
tember 25, 194L 
